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Abstract: To address the rise in non-communicable diseases (NCDs),
governments are now being urged to ‘put forward a multisectoral approach
for health at all government levels, to address NCD risk factors and
underlying determinants of health comprehensively and decisively’ [UN, 2011.
Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the
Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (No. A/66/L.1). New
York, NY: United Nations]. There is a global consensus that whole-ofgovernment approaches (WG) can be particularly effective in regulating
products such as tobacco, pre-packaged foods and alcohol, which are or can
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be major risk factors for NCDs. Despite the overwhelming push towards
interagency arrangements for health policymaking and implementation,
including in contemporary efforts to prevent and control NCDs, there has
been minimal investigation into how countries have pursued WG and which
types of institutional designs and arrangements offer particular utility to
achieve health objectives. This article examines these issues through a case
study concerning the interagency mechanism that the Philippine government
currently utilizes to govern tobacco control, the Interagency Committee—
Tobacco (IAC-T). We conducted key informant interviews (n = 33) with
government officials, and representatives from civil society organizations,
health professional associations and intergovernmental organizations. We
targeted informants who have been involved in the work of the IAC-T and/or
tobacco control policy more broadly. We also analysed public documents to
contribute to our analysis of the structure, functioning and legal status of the
IAC-T. Our findings highlight two salient challenges that arose in the
Philippines case: (1) the inclusion of industry representation on the IAC-T and
(2) the attempt to consolidate the responsibilities of the different departments
through a policy of ‘balance’ between health and commercial interests. We
analyse how health proponents navigated this challenging institutional
arrangement and the various barriers they faced in achieving the intended
health objectives. We draw from this case to discuss the lessons that can
inform broad calls for WG to NCDs.
Keywords: Whole-of-government, intersectoral collaboration, tobacco
control, health policy, non-communicable diseases, Health in All Policies
Key Messages




Whole-of-government approaches to non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) hold promise for policy coherence across sectors.
The whole-of-government approach to tobacco control in the
Philippines demonstrates that not all such approaches best serve
health objectives.
This article points to the importance of not only structural features of
whole-of-government approaches for NCD control but also the
institutional culture and entrenched political and economic interests.

Introduction
The most recent evidence from the Global Burden of Disease
Study indicates that the number of deaths from communicable
diseases in 2010 has decreased by approximately 10% since 1990,
whereas the burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) has
increased markedly, now accounting for two of every three deaths
worldwide and 54% of disability-adjusted life years (up from 43% in
1990) (Lozano et al. 2012; Murray et al. 2012). To address this
increase in NCDs, governments are encouraging each other to ‘put
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forward a multisectoral approach for health at all government levels,
to address NCD risk factors and underlying determinants of health
comprehensively and decisively’ (UN 2011). There is a global
consensus that whole-of-government approaches (WG) can be
particularly effective in regulating products such as tobacco, prepackaged foods and alcohol, which are or can be major risk factors for
NCDs (Beaglehole et al. 2011). This emphasis on WG began with calls
for intersectoral action in the Declaration of Alma Ata, then as healthy
public policy in the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (WHO 1986;
Nutbeam 1994), and most recently in the discourse on Health in All
Policies (HiAP) (Kickbusch et al. 2008). Proponents suggest that the
objective of HiAP can be realized through a ‘collaborative approach to
improving the health of all people by incorporating health
considerations into decision-making across sectors and policy areas’
(Rudolph et al. 2013). The HiAP discourse explicitly incorporates the
language used by proponents of WG such as ‘joined-up-government’
(Kickbusch et al. 2008; Kickbusch 2010). In other words, WG is
recognized as a vehicle to achieve the health objectives of HiAP.
Early proponents of the WG to governance observed that many,
if not all, government departments largely functioned along discrete
lines with minimal collaboration or co-operation across sectors that
lead to government inefficiencies and internal conflicts. These early
proponents viewed the WG as a means of moving public policy out of
ministerial silos with the ultimate goal of establishing and
implementing coherent policy across sectors (Christensen and Lægreid
2007). Other purported benefits include cost sharing (i.e. pooling of
resources) (Vangen and Huxham 2003; Lundin 2007), enhanced policy
coherence (Kavanagh and Richards 2001; De Alba 2012) and
accountability across sectors (Wilkins 2002). Health policy proponents
of WG have advocated for the insertion of health into the portfolios of
agriculture, finance, labour, foreign affairs and other sectors (Vega
2004; Marmot et al. 2008; WHO 2009; Kickbusch 2010). The central
rationale provided in the health policy literature in favour of WG is that
many health problems require crosscutting solutions (Sacks et al.
2009). WG are seen to facilitate the realization of health objectives by
creating public policy that systematically incorporates health objectives
across government sectors. For example, it is known that tobacco
control, with the ultimate goal of decreased tobacco consumption,
requires co-ordination across sectors such as finance (e.g. taxation
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strategies), agriculture (e.g. crop substitution programmes), and
health (e.g. tobacco cessation programmes). WG are not without
challenges. Some studies have found that conflicting objectives among
different sectors can lead to stalemate or fragmentation in decisionmaking (Exworthy and Powell 2004), resource inefficiencies or loss of
departmental autonomy (Vincent 1999; Exworthy and Powell 2004;
Coulson 2005). The principal question that needs to be asked is how
can WG best meet the intended health objectives?
Before we discuss our research into the case of the Philippine
Interagency Committee—Tobacco (IAC-T), it is important to clarify
what we mean by interagency arrangement in order to facilitate future
comparative work across countries, institutional designs and
processes. We use the term interagency arrangement to mean formal
(i.e. politically mandated) relationships between more than two sectors
(i.e. a section of government that deals exclusively with a particular
issue such as health, justice or agriculture). An interagency
arrangement is one type of WG. Many partnerships in the health sector
involve voluntary arrangements that address a particular
administrative issue or enhance access to products or services (Buse
and Walt 2000a,b; Buse and Waxman 2001). Interagency
arrangements are often established when a particular goal is thought
to be best achieved through co-operation (instrumental value) or when
actors have a commitment to inclusive governance or question the
legitimacy of top-down decision-making (intrinsic value) (Lasker et al.
2001; Coulson 2005; Ansell and Gash 2008). Governments have
begun to mandate interagency arrangements to address NCDs,
specifically in the area of tobacco control. For example, the tobacco
control legislation in Kenya establishes the Tobacco Control Board that
advises on the implementation of the Tobacco Control Act of 2007
(Tobacco Control Act 2007, 2007). Brazil has a similar interagency
arrangement (CONICQ) but with a broad mandate to strengthen
tobacco control in the country and implement the provisions of the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (Lee et al. 2010).
In some contrast, such arrangements have yet to be
systematically instituted by governments in the areas of food and
alcohol governance. The cases of WG to tobacco control can provide
important lessons for food and alcohol governance; particularly given
that each area involves a commercial entity whose products are
Health Policy and Planning, Vol 30, No. 7 (September 2015): pg. 844-852. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Oxford University Press.

4

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

associated risk factors for NCDs. It has been argued that prepackaged
food and alcohol pose less risk to human health than tobacco, yet
scholars have begun to make the case that the differences among the
three are outweighed by their similarity (Brownell and Warner 2009;
Moodie et al. 2013). The most important similarity between the three
products, one that allows for lessons from the regulation of one
product to be applied to the others, is that all three industries actively
seek no or minimal regulation of their products (Brownell and Warner
2009; Moodie et al. 2013). The food industry, such as the tobacco
industry, is known to heavily lobby government to prevent the
regulation of their products (Brownell and Warner 2009; Cappuccio et
al. 2013). Arguably, WG to food and alcohol regulation are even more
vulnerable to industry co-option given that, particularly for food, the
two industries have been successful in framing the linkage between
their products and NCDs as an issue of consumer choice rather than an
issue inherent to the product itself. For example, the food industry
asserts that there is no ‘bad’ food but rather bad individual choices
(Koplan and Brownell 2010). The success of this type of rhetoric is
reflected in the willingness of norm-setting organizations such as the
World Health Organization (WHO) and governments to partner with
the food industry in health education and promotion campaigns
(Koplan and Brownell 2010; Stuckler and Nestle 2012). The norms
pertaining to tobacco and the tobacco industry are markedly different
where many governments and prominent intergovernmental
organizations such as the WHO and the World Bank explicitly prohibit
partnerships with the tobacco industry. In other words, governments
do not have the same social sensitivity or institutional policies against
partnering with the food industry as they do with the tobacco industry.
Given this complex policy space there is a pressing need to examine
how countries have pursued WG and which types of institutional
arrangements offer particular utility for achieving health objectives
(Kickbusch 2010). Our research examines these issues through a case
study of the IAC-T, the interagency mechanism instituted by the
Philippine government to govern tobacco control. The Tobacco
Regulation Act (hereafter RA 9211) is the principal Act governing
tobacco in the Philippines and establishes the IAC-T to implement the
provisions of the Act (Tobacco Regulation Act 2003).
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Methods
We chose this salient case because the Philippines was one of
the first countries to mandate an interagency arrangement for tobacco
control. We explore this institutional arrangement using different data
sources. Our investigation includes interviews with key informants (n
= 33) from different sectors of government, civil society, the tobacco
industry and the tobacco-growing sector (see Table 1). Key informants
were chosen because of their involvement in tobacco control in the
Philippines, and more specifically their involvement with the IAC-T. We
included informants who served on the IAC-T as well as individuals
who had contact with members of the IAC-T in their work on tobacco
issues. We also used a snowball sampling technique wherein the
informants that we initially identified were asked to suggest other
individuals who they thought could contribute to our understanding of
the structure and functioning of the IAC-T. All informants were asked
whether their institutional affiliation could be included in the
presentation of the findings. Documents were also included for
analysis, which included government legislation, policy and technical
briefs, and domestic legal disputes involving the IAC-T. We transcribed
the interviews verbatim. The transcripts were entered into NVivo
qualitative software and were analysed along with the documentary
sources using open coding. We used the open coding technique to
facilitate inductive analysis. The authors obtained ethical approval
from their institute.
Table 1. List of key informants by affiliation
Number of participants

Government

2

Department of Finance

6

Department of Trade and Industry

2

Department of Agriculture

5

Department of Health

1

Department of Foreign Affairs

1

National Tobacco Administration

2

Legislature
Civil society

4

Health NGOs

2

Medical Association

1

Trade Union

3

Tobacco Industry
Intergovernmental organizations
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Number of participants

Government

2

World Bank

2

World Trade Organization

Results
As mentioned above, the IAC-T is responsible for implementing
and enforcing the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (RA 9211). Our
findings focus on both RA 9211 and the IAC-T as we demonstrate that
the Act and the mandated interagency arrangement are reinforcing. It
is specified in RA 9211 that the secretary of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) is to serve as chair of the IAC-T and the secretary
of the Department of Health (DOH) is to serve as vice-chair. Six other
departments are represented on the committee along with a
‘representative from the Tobacco industry to be nominated by the
legitimate and recognized associations of the industry’ (Tobacco
Regulation Act 2003) and one representative from civil society
nominated by the DOH. Inclusion of an industry representative on the
IAC-T seemed to play an important role in preempting FCTC Article
5.3, which requires Parties to act to protect public health policies with
respect to tobacco control from commercial and other vested interests
of the tobacco industry. Our findings suggest that the timing of RA
9211, with the formal inclusion of a tobacco industry representative on
the IAC-T, prior to the Philippines ratifying the FCTC, has pre-empted
the movement towards FCTC compliant legislation.

RA 9211, the IAC-T and FCTC pre-emption
The Philippines Congress adopted the Act in 2003, 2 years
before the country ratified the FCTC, but only a few months after
adoption of the Convention by the World Health Assembly. As such, RA
9211 does not purport to incorporate the FCTC into domestic law. One
director-level key informant from the World Bank based in the
Philippines noted that there is still much confusion in government and
civil society on the legal authority of the FCTC. The Philippines is a
dualist legal system meaning that ‘the constitution of the state accords
no special status to treaties; the rights and obligations created by
them have no effect in domestic law unless legislation is in force to
give effect to them (original emphasis)’ (Aust 2007). The fact that the
Philippines must pass legislation to enact the provisions of the FCTC
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into domestic law heightens the importance of RA 9211 as a preemptive measure. The timing of the legislation appears to have served
the protection of industry interests, ensuring that the industry has a
seat on the only mandated tobacco control body in the country (IACT)—an arrangement that would be unlikely post-FCTC—and the
correspondingly weak tobacco control measures introduced in RA 9211
(i.e. mostly weaker than those required by the FCTC). An additional
nuance to the timing of RA 9211 is that industry interests are better
positioned to dissuade the establishment of an FCTC-compliant
legislation. Our findings point out that these two elements (i.e.
industry inclusion and weak legislation) are reinforcing, whereby the
composition of the IAC-T makes enforcement of RA 9211 difficult by
taking away power from the DOH, whereas the Act itself makes it
difficult for the DOH to move towards FCTC-compliant measures.
Key informants from DTI confirmed the central role of RA 9211
in Philippine tobacco control stating that ‘policy on cigarettes and
tobacco comes from RA 9211’, and that it ‘is the policy and law with
respect to tobacco and cigarettes that we follow’. This perspective was
enshrined in a decision given by the Court of Appeals in a recent case
between Philip Morris Philippines (PMPMI) and the DOH (Philip Morris
Philippines Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, n.d.).
PMPMI petitioned the court to compel the DOH and the Bureau of Food
and Drugs (now the Food and Drug Administration) to grant them the
ability to carry out promotional activities, which they argued was
lawful according to RA 9211. The DOH had summarily denied PMPMI’s
application for permission to engage in promotional activities
independently of the IAC-T and indicated to PMPMI that tobacco
companies were no longer permitted to do so according to RA 9211,
but more importantly the DOH used the provisions of the FCTC to
justify their decision. In other words, the DOH used not only the
domestic legislation (which permits promotional activity) but also the
provisions of the FCTC (which discourages promotional activity). The
Court of Appeals decided in favour of PMPMI’s petition and stated that:
“The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is not
self-executing and cannot be the direct legal basis for the
respondents to justify its mistaken stance that Tobacco
Promotions are now fully prohibited … it provides only for the
gradual elimination of tobacco due to health concerns and
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takes into account the “legal environment and technical
means available” to the signatory-Country. Until such time
when there is already a new law totally eliminating all forms of
tobacco use and tobacco-related activities, this Court has not
other recourse but to act only in accordance with the prevailing
R.A. No. 9211.” [No emphasis added] (Philip Morris Philippines
Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, n.d.)
The findings from our interviews indicate that the Philippines Tobacco
Institute (PTI), an industry interest group, and/or its key members
also advance the authority of RA 9211 in the public discourse on the
relationship between the Act and the FCTC, further supporting the
argument that the Act indeed has served to preempt stricter tobacco
control measures from the FCTC and has served to situate power and
control within the IAC-T rather than with the health sector specifically.
In another legal case in 2011, the PTI sought to set aside the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of the Food and Drug
Administration Act of 2009, arguing that they did not apply to tobacco
products because the IRR went beyond RA 9211. The PTI specifically
argued that:
“the IRR of R.A. No. 9711 which placed tobacco products within
the regulatory powers of the Food and Drug Administration was
issued by the respondents in disregard of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9211 otherwise known as the ‘Tobacco
Regulation Act of 2003’ which bestows the exclusive authority to
regulate tobacco products upon the Interagency TobaccoCommittee, where petitioner is also a member.” (Philippine
Tobacco Institute v. The Department of Health 2011)
The court decided against PTI in this case stating that they did not
provide sufficient evidence of definite or immediate harm to the
petitioner. It is important to note that the ruling was issued because
the ‘allegations (by PTI) fail to establish an actual existing right on the
part of the petitioner (PTI) that was violated’, not because the court
decided on the relationship between the IRR and RA 9211 (i.e. the
authority of the IAC-T) (Philippine Tobacco Institute v. The
Department of Health 2011). Also, the PTI explicitly used their
membership on the IAC-T in their argumentation, which suggests that
industry interests support the IAC-T. The industry has not argued
against the IAC-T like it has other perceived shifts of authority to
health-oriented government departments and agencies. One would
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expect the industry to vehemently oppose the IAC-T if the industry
thought that their interests were threatened by its authority and
functioning, as indicated by these two cases.

The challenge of incrementalism
There was and continues to be tension about whether some
tobacco control legislation is better than none (an incrementalist
approach) among tobacco control proponents in the Philippines. Some
tobacco control proponents in the Philippines, a minority, argue that
certain perceived improvements in tobacco control legislation might
actually hinder the movement towards strong future tobacco control
legislation. Beginning in the drafting stages of RA 9211 there were
conflicting perspectives on the utility of the Act, specifically because of
the composition of the IAC-T. Prior to the adoption of RA 9211, a highranking government official in the DOH, with experience in tobacco
control, including with the FCTC, commented that the draft Act should
be ‘vetoed because congress made the Department of Trade the chair
of the overall committee instead of the Department of Health …
(which) was a signal to me that this was obviously … geared towards
trade, and health was an afterthought’. In contrast, a prominent
tobacco control advocate from civil society had urged this official to
support the Act, noting, ‘no matter how imperfect it is I think we can
start with something rather than have nothing at all’. The merit of an
incremental approach to tobacco control legislation was echoed in all
of the interviews with tobacco control advocates from civil society. Our
findings suggest that, apart from the possible benefits of having some
tobacco control legislation, the IAC-T is a persistent challenge to
tobacco control efforts.

‘Balancing’ private interests and health
The first paragraph of RA 9211 states:
“It is the policy of the State to protect the populace from
hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill
health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the
State … to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the
interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the tobacco
industry. For these purposes, the government shall institute a
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balanced policy whereby … tobacco products shall be
regulated in order to promote a healthful environment … and at
the same time ensure that the interest of tobacco farmers,
growers, workers and stakeholders are not adversely
compromised.” (emphasis added) (Tobacco Regulation Act
2003)
This explicit statement for the need to balance health and
economic aspects of tobacco and tobacco control has served to reify
the perspective that health is only one consideration in Philippine
tobacco control policy. Interviewees from public health agencies and
organizations consistently raised concerns that the emphasis within
the IAC-T has typically focused on business aspects of tobacco
regulation. Participants from DTI emphasized unprompted that RA
9211 represents a ‘balance’ between health and stakeholders from the
tobacco sector. The fact that the DTI chairs the IAC-T in the
Philippines is unusual given that tobacco control is a health issue and
not an economic issue. The composition and structure of the IAC-T
provides evidence that structure matters for WG to health policy, while
also demonstrating that an entrenched institutional culture that
attempts to ‘balance’ health with tobacco industry interests creates an
interagency arrangement that perpetuates a tenuous and often
crippling context from a health policy perspective. This emphasis on
‘balance’ appears to be more of an attempt to insert and protect
industry interests in a health measure that should necessarily restrict
their commercial activity. Tobacco control is logically oriented to
regulate industry activity, not to balance its interests with health
objectives. The fact that this emphasis on balance is explicit in RA
9211 legitimizes the orientation of the IAC-T towards protecting the
tobacco industry from harm and again the reinforcing nature of the Act
and the IAC-T is visible. To restate, the text of RA 9211 decenters
health objectives while at the same time foregrounding industry
interests. This text is then used as justification for the inclusion of the
tobacco industry on the IAC-T, the leadership of the IAC-T being
situated with DTI and the overt agenda of the IAC-T to protect the
economic viability of the industry.
Despite these overt challenges, we found other subtle
challenges that arise in the different ‘theories’ held by different key
actors about the roles of government sectors and their responsibilities
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to society. The difference in perspectives is a common challenge of WG
to health policy, particularly if the objective is policy coherence. For
example, it was a common sentiment by all key informants that each
department was guided by different rules both domestically and
internationally. DTI noted that they are guided by the rules of the
World Trade Organization and free trade agreements. DTI, the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the National Tobacco
Administration (NTA) indicated that they are responsible to protect the
interests of both industry and tobacco growers. DTI pointed out that
the tobacco industry is a legal entity and therefore one of its legitimate
constituents. They noted that they have a difficult time reconciling
their responsibilities as the chair of the committee while being
responsive to a major industry. They suggest that they understand the
spirit of Article 5.3 of the FCTC, which is meant to protect tobacco
control policies from tobacco industry interference, but point out that it
directly contradicts their official mandate.
It is not surprising that both the DOH and tobacco control nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) found this responsibility in conflict
with their own mandates to protect Philippine citizens from the harms
of tobacco consumption and to implement the provisions of the FCTC.
Many of the tobacco control advocates from civil society noted that
they refused to meet with the IAC-T when the industry representative
was present. Key informants from the DOH expressed that they were
frustrated with the IAC-T arrangements, and have even refused to
attend some meetings on suspicion that the industry representative
uses information from the IAC-T meetings to counter the DOH. A
participant from DTI noted that they found it ‘strange that NGO health
advocates have this policy of not sitting at the table with cigarette
companies, but because we are a trade department, it is natural for us
to consult all stakeholders … One of the stakeholders is the industry’.
The different theories of multisectoral governance held by the
different sectors of government are best characterized as (1) public
health should take precedence over private interests, (2) private
interests should take precedence over public health, and (3) there
should be a balance between public health and private interests
objectives. RA 9211 clearly rejects the first theory by legislating the
inclusion of industry representation on the IAC-T, providing the chair
position to DTI, and making a commitment to balance industry
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interests and health objectives. This same conflict of theories is likely
to occur when WG are applied to food and alcohol governance. As
mentioned in the introduction, the food industry has made efforts to
present their products as risk-neutral or even free of risk in relation to
NCDs. This framing is clearly meant to protect the viability of their
business amidst threats from those who seek to regulate and thus
mitigate the consumption of such products on health grounds. It is
important to note that economics and health are not inherently in
opposition; in fact, one can facilitate the other, and thus policy
coherence is a reasonable objective of WG. It is clear that many of the
social determinants of health are rooted in economic prosperity, such
as employment or public services that receive their funding in part
from the revenue generated from the private sector.
It is crucial to disentangle the concept of private interests from
economic policy. These two are often conflated, creating a situation
where a dichotomy between economics and health is easily
perpetuated. It is possible, for example, for the DTI to discourage
tobacco production while supporting economic development in other
industries. In other words, economic development does not necessarily
require the uniform support of all private commercial activity,
specifically when such activity poses a threat to broader public welfare
(the principal rationale used to support public regulations). This
distinction is fundamental when confronting the argument that the
commercial activity of tobacco, food or alcohol companies must be
balanced with health objectives. The protection and promotion of
industry interests by the DTI and other departments is not a necessary
consequence of having a WG to tobacco control. Rather the idea of
‘balance’ supported by the DTI and other departments perpetuates an
IAC-T structure that protects and promotes the tobacco industry to the
direct detriment of public health. The separation of health and industry
interests may serve as a precondition for successful interagency
arrangements. In other words, tobacco legislation that brings together
industry interests and health objectives in order to ‘balance’ the two,
as RA 9211 does, leads to a space of competing objectives rather than
a space that can foster coherence.
The DOH has responded to the unfavourable composition of the
IAC-T using two strategies: (1) attempting to denormalize industry
representation and (2) creating new distinct forums where the DOH
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can act autonomously from the IAC-T. The first strategy is represented
by the action taken by the DOH to produce a Memorandum in 2010 on
tobacco industry interference and means to protect against such
interference (DOH 2010). This Memorandum provides guidelines for
industry interactions and the denormalization of industry activities in
line with the provisions of Article 5.3 of the FCTC. The DOH has had to
navigate the presence of the industry on the IAC-T while attempting to
limit their power as reflected in the following statement: ‘The
Department of Health does NOT deal with the tobacco industry or
individuals or entities that work to further the interests of the tobacco
industry, except to the extent strictly necessary to effectively regulate,
supervise, or control the tobacco industry and tobacco products’
(original emphasis) (DOH 2010).
The DOH has attempted to create alternative forums to the IACT in order to move towards FCTC commitments. In 2011, DOH led the
drafting of the National Tobacco Control Strategy (NCTS) and the
Tobacco Control Action Plan 2011–16. The NCTS ‘reflects the
government’s political commitment for the complete implementation of
the WHO-FCTC’ (National Tobacco Control Strategy (2011–16) 2010),
apparently an initiative to move towards implementing the provisions
of the FCTC and phase out the limitations of RA 9211. The DOH
established a Sector-Wide Anti-Tobacco (SWAT) committee and 11
sub-committees meant to address the provisions of the FCTC. Here the
DTI is a member, and always attends meetings, but there is no
industry representative. SWAT is an attempt at interagency relations,
minus the tobacco industry, as envisioned in the FCTC. Although SWAT
has fully rolled out committees with responsibilities, it does not have
legal standing. In fact, proponents are seeking an Executive Order to
mandate the SWAT Committee.
In 2008, there was hope that the DOH had achieved some
autonomy from the IAC-T proper when the IAC-T produced a
memorandum establishing ‘Pilot Agencies’ (DTI 2008). The
Memorandum divides responsibility between the DTI and the DOH.
According to the Memorandum, the DTI is responsible for access
restrictions including issues such as minimum age sales, proof of age
verification and sale of tobacco products within school perimeters,
among others, and the DOH is responsible for the administration of
Healthful Environment (e.g. smoking ban in public places, etc.) and
Health Policy and Planning, Vol 30, No. 7 (September 2015): pg. 844-852. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Oxford University Press.

14

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Advertising and Promotions (e.g. package warnings, restrictions on
advertising and promotions, etc.). The establishment of Pilot Agency
authority appeared to strengthen the autonomy of the DOH to monitor
and enforce key facets of the Philippines tobacco control strategy.
However, the above-mentioned case between PMPMI and the DOH
resulted in a judicial decision that denounced the autonomy of DOH
from the IAC-T and ultimately ruled that the DOH does not have the
delegated authority to administer RA 9211 outside of the IAC-T (Philip
Morris Philippines Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health,
n.d.). PMPMI claimed that the carte blanche decision not to accept
tobacco industry applications for promotional activities was unlawful
given that the authority to implement RA 9211 was housed with the
IAC-T. The Court of Appeals decided that ‘importantly, the DOH, by
itself, is without any authority to enforce any provision of R.A. No.
9211’, and went further to state that ‘without a doubt, the DOH
arrogated to itself the authority given exclusively to the IAC-Tobacco
to administer and implement the provisions of the Tobacco Regulation
Act allegedly violated by petitioner’ (Philip Morris Philippines
Manufacturing, INC. v. The Department of Health, n.d.). This judicial
decision confirms again the finding that RA 9211 has served in a way
to tie the hands of those seeking to implement FCTC-compliant
measures and has located the authority for tobacco control in the IACT. The DOH continues to attempt the second strategy of autonomous
action; however, this case demonstrates the challenges DOH has had
in establishing authority and autonomy to act outside of the purview of
the IAC-T.

Conclusion
The IAC-T has clearly created challenges for those attempting to
strengthen tobacco control in the Philippines. RA 9211 and the IAC-T
have become negatively reinforcing from the perspective of tobacco
control. In sum, what lessons can be drawn from the Philippine
tobacco control case that can be applied to the future of WG to NCD
prevention and control?
In the future, WG to NCD prevention and control should exclude
tobacco, food and alcohol industry representatives from mandated
interagency arrangements. The principal rationale to support this
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position is that horizontal collaboration between the regulator(s) and
the regulated industry risks co-option by private interests (regulatory
capture). This is not to say that the inclusion of industry
representatives necessarily leads to capture, but such an arrangement
logically increases the chance of this happening. We noted that
generally private interests resist regulation and this is true of the
tobacco, food and alcohol industries (Moodie et al. 2013). This industry
penchant against regulation creates a difficult dynamic for those
seeking industry regulation to achieve health objectives. Chaiton et al.
(2006) argue that ‘the corporate nature of tobacco companies is a
structural obstacle to reducing harm caused by tobacco use’, which
could also arguably be applied to the production of prepackaged food
and alcohol. Systemic exclusion of industry from mandated
interagency arrangements would still allow appropriate government
departments to interact with industry, but not as partners in a
mandated institutional arrangement around the development of health
policy. For example, interagency arrangements can host public
consultations with industry stakeholders. Such interactions should still
require standards of transparency and accountability by ensuring that
such meetings are in the public record and meeting minutes are
recorded. In sum, proponents of WG to NCD prevention and control
should not be distracted by purported differences between the three
industries but should establish a common standard that protects
against the inclusion of private interests in formal government
decision-making/enforcing structures. To reiterate, a mandated
interagency arrangement is a public institution and the implications of
relegating power to the members from the commercial sector must be
considered in light of the policy goals guiding the function of the
institution. The Philippine case highlights the problems that arise when
a policy creates space for the policy preferences of private commercial
interests to be weighed against health objectives.
The Philippine case demonstrates that a policy of ‘balance’ can
create a problematic situation for those seeking enhanced industry
regulation towards health ends. The emphasis on ‘balance’ can be
particularly problematic when other department objectives contradict
health objectives (Gould 2005; Jarman et al. 2012; Gleeson and Friel
2013; Drope and Lencucha 2014). Similar clashes in objectives are
likely to emerge in the control of unhealthy foods or alcohol, and may
be more complicated by the fact that the food industry has been
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working to project itself as a legitimate partner in efforts to address
obesity, diabetes and other NCDs (Ludwig and Nestle 2008; Brownell
and Warner 2009). In the case of the Philippines, some department
objectives were justified by a policy of ‘balance’. This so-called
‘balance’ between industry interests and health objectives is explicitly
written in the legislation and must be avoided in future legislation
pertaining to product regulation and NCD prevention and control. The
case of RA 9211 and the IAC-T demonstrates how policy precedes
institutional arrangements and thus sets the direction of the function
of these arrangements. The transferable lesson is that policy for NCD
prevention and control must be clearly and explicitly oriented to health
objectives. A genuinely balanced policy can be fostered at the macrolevel of whole-of-government, whereby a government pursues
objectives of economic prosperity parallel to objectives of health and
welfare. This type of balance is possible. Problems occur when a policy
of balance is promoted at the micro-level of a particular healthharming product, such as tobacco. For example, tobacco consumption
is harmful and tobacco must be regulated for the public good and this
regulation must take precedence over industry interests. In other
words, the nature of tobacco is harmful to health and a policy of
balance is untenable. This same logic can and should apply to the food
and alcohol industry. The logic returns to the importance of
disaggregating private commercial interests from public policy that
fosters economic prosperity. A government is not obligated to regulate
all commercial activity in the same way, particularly when that activity
is a threat to public health.
A more nuanced lesson is that health advocates must be
sensitive to the institutional constraints imposed on economic agencies
to represent all stakeholders. Given the tenuous environment of
interagency relations it is necessary to approach this issue not with
reproach but with understanding of the constraints imposed on the
different economic agencies to consult with all stakeholders (Drope
and Lencucha 2013). As noted above, such consultation must be open
and transparent. Advocates of WG to NCD prevention and control must
find creative strategies that protect consultations from industry
interference while respecting the possibility that some agencies might
be compelled to interact with the tobacco industry. This context
supports the need to have leadership of mandated interagency
arrangements situated in health departments. For example, health
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agencies can operate independent of the (real or perceived) need to
consult with the industry. This independence can support a more
specifically health-focused orientation in interagency arrangements
and can provide the authority to steer the group towards health goals.
In addition to the issue of leadership, it may be necessary to create
arrangements that include some sectors and exclude others. This may
not represent the WG ideal in the true sense of all-inclusiveness, but
rather establishes a selective group of members who are aligned on
the foundational health objectives. This type of arrangement might be
necessary in the case of intractable conflicts of perspective (i.e.
theories of intersectoral governance) across sectors. For example, this
might be needed in countries that are only beginning to address
tobacco, food and alcohol control and have departments or agencies
that are deeply enmeshed with commercial interests. In many ways,
the Philippines experience with tobacco control is a cautionary tale for
countries seeking to develop new policies and institutional
arrangements for NCD prevention and control. With new global
strategies at the WHO on harmful use of alcohol, diet and physical
activity, it is plausible that governments will soon face these
challenges in other areas of health if they do not already (Gould 2005;
Gleeson and Friel 2013).
Governments are far from monolithic and within each one there
exist discrete agencies and actors with different and sometimes
contradictory mandates. WG can offer a useful forum to create and
implement policy for NCD prevention and control. There is a pressing
need to interrogate how these arrangements are designed, who is
included and what is the nature of the policy that is guiding the
function of these arrangements. In fact, as we observe in this critical
case, the chosen WG structure continues to shape the ultimate
outcomes. In this scenario, the proponents of tobacco interests
appeared to have gained a distinct advantage by enshrining an
interagency arrangement that over-privileges private commercial
interests over health concerns. Thus, the choices that governments
make when structuring WG to NCD prevention and control are crucial.
Intergovernmental organizations and governments must consider the
implications and nuanced forms of WG when advocating for their
establishment.
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